SuperDRM

Privacy Policy

Version 2026-09-21 · How SuperFile Inc. [confirm] handles personal data in SuperDRM.

Two different kinds of person appear in this policy: you, the customer who has an account with us, and your viewers, the people whose players ask us for licences. We are the controller for your account data. For viewer data we are your processor — the Data Processing Addendum governs that, and this policy describes what we actually store.

Your account

WhatWhyKept
Email, name, password hash, or the SuperID / Google identifier you signed in withTo have an account at allUntil you delete the account
Passkeys (public key and metadata — never a private key)Passwordless sign-inUntil removed, or the account is deleted
Sessions: a hashed token, the user agent, a salted hash of your IP addressKeeping you signed in; showing you your own sessionsUntil expiry or sign-out, then purged nightly
Acceptance of these documents: the version and the timestampTo show what you agreed to, and whenWith the account
Audit log: who did what in a workspaceSecurity, and answering “who rotated that key?”90 days
Support email you send usTo answer youAs long as needed for the matter
Data-subject requests you make: kind, date, outcomeTo show your request was answered, and in time24 months after it is closed
A Global Privacy Control signal your browser sent, with a salted hash of your IP addressTo show we saw it and acted on it90 days

Your workspace also holds things that are about the workspace rather than about you: its name and plan, API-key names and prefixes (never the key), verified domains, content-key labels, attested-device fingerprints, and who accepted the data-processing terms. They are in your export too.

Cookies. Three, all strictly necessary, all first-party: sdsess — your signed-in session, 30 days, HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax; a short-lived state cookie during sign-in with SuperID or Google; and sdrm_live on the gated operations console. There is no analytics cookie, no advertising cookie and no third-party cookie, which is why you are not asked to dismiss a banner.

Your viewers

Every licence request writes one row. That row is pseudonymous, not anonymous: it can single out a person even though it holds no name.

FieldWhat it is
user_refThe viewer identifier you put in the licence token. We never see who it refers to.
device_hashA truncated hash of the client/device identifier in the CDM request.
ip_hashA salted hash of the viewer's IP address (SUPERDRM_IP_SALT). We do not store the address itself.
uaThe user agent string the player sent (first 200 characters).
clientThe make, model and platform the CDM itself reported — the one platform signal a licence server can trust, because the user agent is the client's own claim.
ResultSystem, security level, latency, whether the licence was granted or refused and why.

These rows are deleted after 90 days by a job that runs nightly. What survives is a daily count per workspace, per system, granted and refused — no viewer data in it. The retention period is a deployment setting (SUPERDRM_LICENCE_RETENTION_DAYS); the number shown here is the one this deployment runs.

Sharing signals — working out that one viewer reference is on many devices, or one device carries many viewer references — is profiling of your end users. It is off by default and can only be switched on by a workspace owner who has accepted the DPA.

The viewer's IP address itself is never written to our database. It exists in memory for the length of the request, and in the edge's own logs (Cloudflare). What we keep is the salted hash.

One thing the player fetches from someone else. Our player component needs Shaka Player for FairPlay playback on Apple devices, and by default it loads it from a public CDN (cdnjs.cloudflare.com) — which means that CDN sees your viewer's IP address, user agent and the page they were on. Widevine and Clear Key never load it. You can point the player at your own copy (the shaka-url attribute or window.SUPERDRM_SHAKA_URL) or pre-load Shaka yourself, and then nothing is fetched from anyone but you.

Who else sees data

Subprocessors, and what each one gets:

SubprocessorWhat forWhat reaches them
IBM Cloud — VPC compute, Databases for PostgreSQL, Key Protect (United States)The servers, the database, the HSM root keyEverything the service stores, encrypted at rest; Key Protect sees only wrapped keys
CloudflareThe public edge and the tunnel to our nodesRequest metadata in transit (IP addresses, headers)
[transactional email relay — confirm]Verification, reset, invite and alert emailYour email address and the message
Google LLC — Widevine cloud licence serviceRegistering content keys and signing Widevine licencesThe licence challenge from the viewer's CDM, and key metadata
Apple Inc. — FairPlay StreamingThe FPS key-security module runs on our own nodes; Apple issues the credentialsNothing routine is sent to Apple
EZDRM (only where a workspace uses proxy mode)Relaying licences to a previous vendor during a migrationThe licence challenge and key metadata for those requests
SuperIntel (only if you use the in-portal assistant)Answering your questions about your workspaceYour question and the workspace facts shown on screen
SuperID / super.net (only if you sign in with it)Federated sign-inThe sign-in itself; we receive your identifier, email, name and avatar
Google LLC (only if you sign in with Google)Federated sign-inThe sign-in itself; we receive your identifier, email and name

Full detail, including what each one is contracted to do and where it runs: the DPA's subprocessor table.

We do not sell personal data, and we do not use viewer data to advertise to anyone.

Your rights

If you are in the United States

California, Colorado, Connecticut, Texas, Virginia and a growing list of other states give you rights over your personal data. We give the same rights to everyone, wherever they are, so the controls above are the answer in every case. Four things those laws ask us to say plainly:

Automated decisions. The licence server decides one thing automatically: whether a playback request gets a licence, under the policy our customer set. That affects playback, not any legal right. We make no automated decision about a person with a legal or similarly significant effect, and we do not profile anyone for credit, employment, housing, insurance or education.

Security

Content keys are sealed under a root key held in a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 HSM (IBM Key Protect) which cannot be exported, by us or by IBM. Databases and boot volumes are encrypted; there are no inbound ports on the servers. To report a vulnerability: [email protected], or see /.well-known/security.txt.

Changes

This policy carries the version shown at the top. Material changes are emailed to the address on your account and shown in the portal before they take effect.